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Abstract 
This research examined the influence of culture and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on 
global autobiographical remembering (Study 1a) and on the phenomenological properties 
(Study 1b) and memory content variables (Study 1c) of trauma-specific autobiographical 
remembering. Australian, British and Iranian trauma survivors with and without PTSD 
completed the Autobiographical Memory Test, Self-Defining Memory Task, 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire and provided trauma and negative memory 
narratives. It was found that there were pan-cultural deficits and distortions in the global 
autobiographical remembering of those with PTSD (Study 1a). The presence of PTSD was 
found to moderate the usual effect of culture on the phenomenological properties of the 
trauma memory (Study 1b). Finally, those with PTSD, regardless of cultural background, had 
significantly fewer expressions of autonomy and self-determination in their autobiographical 
remembering than those without PTSD (Study 1c). The findings suggest that pan-culturally 
those with PTSD have similar disruptions and distortions in their autobiographical 
remembering.  
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Culture and the Remembering of Trauma 
Autobiographical memory is central to current understandings of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). That is, those with PTSD exhibit certain disruptions and distortions in their 
autobiographical remembering of the trauma event and show global differences in their 
profiles of more general autobiographical remembering (Brewin, 2011; Brewin, Dalgleish, & 
Joseph, 1996; Dalgleish, 2004; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). While an impressive body of literature 
now exists in terms of the role of autobiographical remembering in PTSD, there remains a 
significant gap in this literature. Specifically, the majority of the literature pertains to trauma 
survivors from Western cultures, despite the increasing recognition that PTSD is observed in 
many different societies and cultures (Foa, Keane, Friedman, & Cohen, 2009) and substantial 
research in the area of cross-culture psychology suggesting that everyday autobiographical 
remembering differs across cultures (Jobson, 2009a). Thus, the question remains, how does 
culture influence the remembering of trauma and thus, the etiology, maintenance and 
treatment of PTSD?  
The hallmark symptom of PTSD is the intrusive recollection of autobiographical 
memories of the trauma which often occur as vivid, highly emotive, sensory-laden 
flashbacks, reliving experiences, intrusive thoughts and images, and nightmares (Brewin et 
al., 1996). Paradoxically, this elevated involuntary access to memories of the trauma is often 
accompanied by compromised voluntary access to coherent accounts of what happened 
during traumatic experiences (Brewin, 2011). Hence, the phenomenological properties of 
trauma accounts often include being fragmented, temporally disorganized and laden with 
sensory-perceptual features (Brewin 2011; Brewin et al., 1996; Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 
1995; Jelinek, Randjbar, Seifert, Kellner, & Moritz, 2009; Jones, Harvey, & Brewin, 2007; 
O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006). These autobiographical memory difficulties have been found to 
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extend beyond the trauma memory to more global autobiographical remembering. For 
instance, research has found that those with PTSD have significant difficulties in providing 
specific autobiographical memories of everyday events (i.e. memories of discrete occasions 
that occurred at a particular time and place). Instead PTSD sufferers tend to retrieve categoric 
overgeneral memories (OGM) (i.e. memories for collections of events) (see Moore & 
Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). Another example of a global autobiographical memory 
difficulty relates to memories of experiences that significantly reflect and inform one’s 
identity. Research has shown that when asked to provide such ‘self-defining memories’, the 
responses of those with PTSD, when compared to trauma survivors without PTSD, tend to be 
strongly associated with their trauma experience (Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008a; Sutherland & 
Bryant, 2005).  
These autobiographical memory disruptions can be conceptualized within our Self 
Memory System model (SMS, Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The SMS 
posits that a motivational hierarchy of goals (the working self) encodes and integrates 
memories into an autobiographical knowledge base – a hierarchically arranged database of 
memories with general summaries of broad categories of lifetime periods at the top and 
increasingly specific details of individual events at the bottom. Voluntary retrieval of specific 
event details requires navigating down this hierarchy. However, retrieval can also occur via 
direct, involuntary access to specific event representations in the memory hierarchy thus 
bypassing the hierarchical search. The integration of autobiographical memories into the 
autobiographical knowledge base allows for elaboration of the memory, which enhances the 
first retrieval route and inhibits the second direct access route. The SMS proposes trauma can 
pose a threat to current goals to which the working self cannot readily adapt. Hence, there are 
no currently active goals that can be used to integrate the trauma memory into the 
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autobiographical knowledge base. Instead the trauma memory remains an event-specific 
representation of the event and is not contextualized within the autobiographical knowledge 
base.  
The SMS provides an account for the three autobiographical memory disruptions 
mentioned above. First, as the trauma memory is not integrated into the autobiographical 
knowledge base it is difficult to retrieve the trauma memory using the hierarchical search as it 
lacks the requisite connections to other autobiographical memories. Rather, it is more likely 
to be activated, involuntarily, via a direct retrieval route that operates via a close link between 
a given retrieval cue and the trauma memory representations. Hence PTSD sufferers 
experience frequent intrusive recollections alongside their compromised voluntary access to 
coherent accounts of the trauma memory. Second, in terms of OGM, we have suggested 
elsewhere (see Williams et al., 2007), that in attempts to avoid the recollection of these 
specific details of the trauma, for PTSD sufferers the hierarchical memory search can get 
diverted towards those higher-level generic representations of personal experience stored 
higher in the hierarchy of the autobiographical knowledge base that represent OGMs. An 
OGM retrieval style may create less affect than the recollection of specific episodic memories 
as remaining at this level of more general information reduces the impact of retrieving 
potentially emotional material. Such strategies, if successful in avoiding aversive 
consequences, will be negatively reinforced. In time, attempts to minimize the retrieval of 
specific memories, in order to reduce retrieval of memories that are painful and affect-laden, 
can develop into an inflexible and habitual autobiographical retrieval pattern and thus, a more 
generic form of avoidance. Consequently, not only do coherent details of the trauma itself 
become difficult to access voluntarily but all specific memory access becomes compromised. 
Third, the SMS emphasizes the need for self-consistency and coherence; the working self 
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aims to reduce the inconsistency between desired goals and the trauma and minimize 
memories that challenge or threaten the coherence of the self-system. Coherence between the 
trauma and the self may be accomplished, to a point, through inhibition or distortion of the 
trauma memory. Over time, these inconsistencies can prove too psychologically demanding 
and may result in transformations to the existing self-concept leading to the development of a 
self that is trauma-centered and which is reflected in self-related remembering (Conway, 
2005).  
Prominent PTSD models (Brewin et al., 1996; Dalgleish, 2004; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Horowitz, 1976; Janoff-Bulman, 1988) similarly suggest that the PTSD trauma memory is 
not well integrated or contextualized. For instance, the dual representation theory (DRT, 
Brewin et al., 1996) suggests there are two memory systems that operate in parallel but one 
system can take precedence over the other at different times. The Situationally Accessible 
Memory (SAM) system is limited to material that was encoded using lower level perceptual 
processing of the traumatic scene, such as sights and sounds, and thus, can only be accessed 
involuntarily through situational reminders of the trauma. The Verbally Accessible Memory 
(VAM) system includes material that was consciously processed during the traumatic event 
and can be accessed through voluntary recall and described verbally. Ideally, SAMs are 
integrated with VAMs to form an elaborate and coherent account of the trauma event. 
However, under extreme stress the conscious processing that leads to VAMs is impaired 
resulting in the domination of the SAM system (Brewin et al., 1996). As a result of very little 
information being encoded in the VAM system, memories of the trauma are repeatedly 
brought to mind as sensory and emotional fragments. As the SAM system does not use a 
verbal code, these memories are difficult to voluntarily communicate to others and the 
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memories do not necessarily interact with, and get updated by, other autobiographical 
knowledge1.  
Culture influences autobiographical remembering through different social 
orientations, beliefs and values, especially those pertaining to the self; despite significant 
individual and situational differences within a particular society (Ross & Wang, 2010; Wang 
& Ross, 2005). Western cultures tend to conceptualize the self as independent, autonomous, 
internally coherent and as a unique collection of internal attributes whose goals are to be 
unique, self-expressive, realize internal attributes and promote individual goals (see Markus 
& Kitayama, 2010). As an individual’s personal experiences are unique, memories of such 
experiences assist an individual in distinguishing him or herself from others and contribute to 
this autonomous self-construal (Ross & Wang, 2010). In many cultures, such as those in 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East (collectivistic cultures), however, a sense of uniqueness, 
independence and autonomy is less relevant to one’s self-concept. Instead such cultures tend 
to emphasize relatedness, interdependence, and the way that the self attends to and fits in 
with others and the surrounding social context (Markus & Kitayama, 2010).  
Research over several decades has demonstrated that these cultural differences 
influence autobiographical remembering. Those from Western/individualistic cultures have 
been found to provide more self-revealing, self-focused, lengthier accounts of specific, 
personal everyday events than those from collectivistic cultures who instead tend to focus on 
collective activities, social interactions and significant others (e.g., Jobson, 2009b, Jobson & 
O'Kearney, 2008b; Wang, 2008; Wang & Conway, 2004; Wang, Leichtman, & Davies, 2000, 
see Ross & Wang, 2010, for review). These differences in memory content variables reflect 
                                                          
1
 More recently the VAM system has been referred to as contextual memory (C-memory) which is abstract, 
contextually bound representations and its representations as C-reps. Similarly, SAMs has more recently been 
referred to as low-level sensation-based memory (S-memory) and its corresponding representations (S-reps) (see 
Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010, for further details). 
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Western cultures emphasising a coherent, well-integrated life story with the individual cast as 
the “lead” as this affirms the self as an autonomous unit, whereas in collectivistic cultures, 
collective activities are often esteemed over this unique life story (Wang, 2001).  
While the cross-cultural study of autobiographical memory has tended to focus on the 
development of narrative in autobiographical memory, research has also demonstrated that 
the properties of autobiographical memories culturally differ (e.g. Rubin, Schrauf, Gulgoz, & 
Naka, 2007).  For instance, Rubin et al. (2007) found that Japanese (a collectivistic culture) 
participants rated many of the phenomenological properties of their autobiographical 
memories significantly lower than that of American (an individualistic culture) participants. 
They suggest that there while the underlying mechanics of memory may be cross-culturally 
identical, there are cultural differences in how individuals assess and experience their 
memories. Those from individualistic cultures may rate the phenomenological properties 
more highly than those from collectivistic cultures as this aligns with individualistic cultures 
stressing their unique autobiographical memories and with an autonomous self-construal 
providing a strong motivation for individuals to attend to, encode, and reflect on their 
autobiographical personal experiences (Ross & Wang, 2010).  
We have used the SMS to account for these cultural differences elsewhere (see 
Conway & Jobson, 2012; Jobson, 2009a). Individuals hold conceptual knowledge about the 
self in relation to others, which is influenced by the cultural conception of selfhood. A focus 
on interdependence versus independence in the self at the cultural level influences the 
content, organization and phenomenological properties of an individual’s autobiographical 
memory. Specifically, while people hold both independent and interdependent goals, one 
orientation is dominant depending on cultural influences. Such goals of the working self 
encode and integrate memories into the autobiographical knowledge base which allows for 
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culturally appropriate elaboration of memories. Thus, when autobiographical memories are 
retrieved either independence or interdependence is emphasized, which, in turn, develops, 
expresses and maintains the culturally-valued self.  
Several questions emerge when we consider these cross-cultural findings in the 
context of our current understandings of PTSD. The first two questions pertain to global 
aspects of autobiographical remembering. First, as outlined above, difficulties in providing 
specific memories has been found to be associated with, and predictive of, PTSD (Moore & 
Zoellner, 2007). Research has demonstrated that specific autobiographical memories of 
personal unique experiences are emphasized in individualistic cultures as they function to 
differentiate the self from others and thus, contribute to the independent self-construal 
(Jobson, 2009b; Ross & Wang, 2010; Wang, 2001; Wang, 2009; Wang & Conway, 2004). 
However, general memories tend to be emphasized in collectivistic cultures as they generally 
feature social relations and conventions, thereby strengthening the interdependent self-
construal (Ross & Wang, 2010). Therefore, an important question is whether the relationship 
between OGM and PTSD still holds in collectivistic populations, where an OGM retrieval 
style may be perceived as less problematic. Second, the SMS suggests that over time, in order 
to reduce inconsistencies between the trauma and self-concept (i.e. in order to maintain self-
coherence), there can be transformations to the existing self-concept. This can lead to the 
development of a self-concept focused on the idea of being a victim of trauma or on 
emphasizing self-change since the event. The SMS suggests that any change in self will be 
motivated by a drive for self-coherence. Maintaining an internally coherent self is imperative 
in individualistic societies and information inconsistent with this congruent self must go 
through repair work to align such information. However, people from collectivistic cultures 
tend to be much more capable of flexibility between social roles and tolerant of differences in 
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their self in these roles (Suh, 2002). Therefore, a second question is whether the relationship 
between a trauma-defined self-concept and PTSD is evident in collectivistic populations.  
The final two questions pertain to remembering of the trauma experience. The trauma 
memory of those with PTSD is considered to be poorly integrated and contextualized in the 
autobiographical knowledge base. This conceivably results in less opportunity for the usual 
cultural influences to exert themselves on the phenomenological properties and memory 
content variables of the PTSD trauma memory, as cultural influences on autobiographical 
remembering operate through language, encoding, integration and elaboration of the memory 
and hierarchical retrieval processes (see Conway & Jobson, 2012; Jobson, 2009a). Therefore, 
the questions arise; are there similar disruptions in the phenomenological properties (i.e. 
being fragmented and laden with sensory-perceptual features) of the trauma memory across 
cultures? And are the memory content variables of the PTSD trauma memory relatively 
immune to cultural influences (i.e. have less of the expected cultural emphasis on either 
autonomy or interdependence)? 
The aim of the current research was to investigate whether PTSD and culture interact 
to influence these global and trauma-specific aspects of autobiographical remembering. 
Specifically, the research addressed the four research questions outlined above; 1) Does the 
relationship between OGM and PTSD still hold in collectivistic populations?; 2) Does the 
relationship between trauma-centered self-definition and PTSD still hold in collectivistic 
populations?; 3) Are there culturally similar disruptions in the phenomenological properties 
of the PTSD trauma memory?; and 4) Are there cultural similarities in the memory content 
variables of the PTSD trauma memory? These research questions were investigated using 
samples of trauma survivors from individualistic and collectivistic cultures. It is noted that 
while the same or overlapping sources were used in this research, to aid in the reporting of 
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findings, the findings were divided into three sub-studies. Study 1a investigated the influence 
of PTSD and culture on global aspects of autobiographical remembering (Research Questions 
1 and 2). Study 1b investigated the influence of PTSD and culture on the phenomenological 
properties of trauma-specific remembering (Research Question 3). Study 1c examined the 
influence of PTSD and culture on the memory content variables of trauma-specific 
remembering (Research Question 4).  
Study 1a 
Study 1a investigated the influence of PTSD and culture on OGM and self-related 
autobiographical remembering. It was firstly hypothesized that while there would be cultural 
differences in autobiographical memory specificity (AMS), those with PTSD pan-culturally 
would engage in similar memory avoidance strategies in order to manage the memory 
disruptions associated with PTSD, resulting in OGM. Secondly, we proposed that universally 
in the aftermath of trauma, the trauma memory of those with PTSD would not align with the 
desired goals of the self-concept and would be hard to integrate with previously held 
assumptions about the self and world. Consequently, the trauma becomes central to people’s 
mental life as they struggle to resolve these discrepancies resulting in a great deal of time 
being spent recalling these events and ruminating about them (Brewin, 2011; Horowitz, 1976, 
Janoff-Bulman, 1992). As a result, the trauma becomes highly associated with the self-
concept (Brewin, 2011) and the traumatic event forms a turning point in people’s 
construction of their own identity and a cognitive reference point for the organization of 
autobiographical knowledge (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Therefore, it was hypothesized that 
pan-culturally those with PTSD would also have more trauma-defined identities and personal 
memories than those without PTSD. Finally it has been suggested that self-concept 
alterations result in poorer memory for experiences about one’s past (Brewin, 2011). 
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Therefore, Study 1a also aimed to examine the relationship between the extent of a trauma-
themed self-concept and degree of OGM. It was hypothesized that there would be a 
significant negative correlation between higher ratings of a trauma-themed self-definition and 
reduced specificity of autobiographical memories. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were British (n= 38), Australian (n= 43) and Iranian (n= 40) trauma 
survivors living in their country of origin. Australia and Britain are considered individualistic 
cultures while Iran is considered a collectivistic society (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 
2010). All participants had experienced a car accident2, physical assault or life-threatening 
illness that would meet PTSD Criterion A in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders-IV-TR (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2004). All participants were recruited from the general 
community by posters in public places, advertisements in local newspapers and contacts with 
organizations that provide treatment for trauma survivors.  
Participants were allocated to either the ‘met diagnosis for PTSD’ group (hereon 
called the ‘PTSD’ group) or ‘did not meet diagnosis for PTSD’ group (hereon called the ‘no 
PTSD’ group) based on their completion of the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS, 
Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993). The PDS was developed to provide a brief self-
report instrument to assist with the diagnosis of PTSD. Parts I and II contain trauma 
screening questions that correspond to PTSD Criterion A DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2004). Part III 
contains 17 items assessing PTSD symptoms. Participants are asked to rate these items, for 
the past month, on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (almost always). The 
ratings of the items are summed to calculate a total severity score. The PDS then ascertains 
                                                          
2
 To control for potential influence of varying trauma types, the analyses were also conducted using just car 
accident trauma survivors. A similar pattern of results emerged. 
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duration of the symptoms (Criteria E) and impairment of functioning (Criteria F). To be 
considered a positive screen on the PDS, a participant must meet Criterion A, endorse a broad 
enough range of symptoms to meet Criteria B (re-experiencing), C (avoidance), and D 
(increased arousal), have symptoms present for over one month, and indicate that the 
disturbances are causing significant impairment in functioning (i.e. a screening diagnosis of 
PTSD is only made if all six DSM-IV criteria are endorsed). The PDS has good convergent 
validity with the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; Spitzer, Williams & 
Gibbon, 1987) (Foa et al., 1993), has good psychometric properties, including with Iranian 
populations (Mirzamani, Mohammadi, & Besharat, 2006; Mirzamani, Mohammadi, 
Mahmoudi-Gharaei, & Mirzamani, 2007), and has been used in previous research using 
Iranian participants (Kolassa et al., 2007). Internal consistency was excellent (Iran α= .97; 
Australia α= .97; Britain α= .91). 
Measures 
All measures were translated into Farsi for use with Iranian participants using the 
following five steps. First, two Iranian native speakers of Farsi, fluent in English, 
independently translated the measures into Farsi. Second, a back translation of the Farsi 
version into English was conducted by a third independent bilingual clinical psychologist in 
Iran. Third, reconciliation of the forward-backward translations was done by the authors. 
Fourth, the Farsi and English drafts were examined and reviewed by clinical psychologists 
for appropriateness. Finally, the measures were piloted on a convenience sample to assess 
ease of comprehension and possible ambiguity.  
Measures 
 AMS 
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 The gold-standard laboratory measure of AMS is the Autobiographical Memory Test 
(AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams et al., 2007). The AMT presents participants 
with lists of cue words and asks them to retrieve a specific memory to each word. The 
following cue words were used in a fixed order; happy, sorry, safe, angry, interest, clumsy, 
success, hurt, surprise, and lonely. Participants were instructed, “You will find a word at the 
top of each page. Please recall a memory of an event that happened to you which the word 
reminds you of. The event could have happened recently or a long time ago. It might be an 
important event or a trivial event. It is important that the memory you recall is of a specific 
event”. An example was provided. Participants were instructed to write their recalled memory 
down in the lined space beneath the word and were given 40 seconds to retrieve a memory. 
Memories were coded as specific if the memory was of an event that lasted less than a day 
and with a distinct time and place. A specificity ratio was developed by dividing the total 
number of specific memories by the number of memories provided. If participants failed to 
generate a memory in the allotted time, their responses were coded as omissions. In line with 
prior studies, nonspecific memories were also coded as categoric (a memory of conflating 
over numerous related events) and extended (a single episodic event that lasts longer than a 
day). Consistent with past studies, specific memory scores were the focus of our analyses 
(e.g. Neshat Doost et al., 2013). However, the pattern of results was the same if numbers of 
OGM were substituted into the analyses. Two assessors, blind to the study’s aims and PTSD 
group allocation of participants, rated the memories for all participants. Twenty percent of 
each data set was also coded by an independent coder who was a trained Farsi-English 
bilingual researcher for inter-coder reliability estimates. Inter-rater reliability was good 
(Kappa coefficient = .86). Discrepancies between raters were resolved through discussion.  
Self-Concept Measures 
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The influence of trauma on self-concept was assessed using a portfolio of widely used 
identity measures; self-cognitions, self-defining memories (SDM) and personal goals. 
Self-cognitions. The Twenty Statement Test (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) was 
used to quantify trauma-related self-cognitions (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008a). The TST 
asks respondents to provide 20 statements in response to the question ‘Who Am I?’  
SDM. Using Singer and Salovey’s (1993) method, participants were informed that “A 
self-defining memory is a memory from your life that you remember very clearly, is 
important to you and leads to strong feelings, that may be either positive or negative, or both. 
It is the kind of memory that helps you to understand who you are and might be the memory 
you would tell someone else if you wanted that person to understand you in a more profound 
way. They are memories that you feel convey powerfully how you have come to be the 
person you currently are. Please briefly write down 5 self-defining memories”. 
Goals. Following other researchers’ measure of personal strivings (Jobson & 
O’Kearney, 2008a; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005), participants were instructed to ‘Please 
provide 15 goals that you feel are important for you to achieve’. 
Coding. Three independent trauma-themed ratios were developed – self-cognitions, 
SDMs and goals, as in previous research (Jobson & O’Kearney, 2006; 2008a; Sutherland & 
Bryant, 2005). These ratios were formed by first coding each response as trauma-themed or 
not. To be coded as trauma-themed, the response had to be directly and clearly related to 
trauma or survival; for self-cognitions (‘victim’, ‘survivor’, ‘scared’, ‘damaged’), for SDM 
(recalling a trauma event that is listed in Part 1 of the PDS’ list of traumatic events; i.e. 
accident, natural disaster, non-sexual assault, sexual assault, military combat, child sexual 
abuse, imprisonment, torture or a life-threatening illness) and for goals (‘I want to survive’, ‘I 
want to get over the trauma’). The total number of trauma-themed responses was tallied for 
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each participant and then these totals were divided by the total number of self-cognitions, 
SDM and goals retrieved, respectively, to provide a trauma-theme ratio for each measure. 
Interrater reliability (κ) was .90 for self-statements, .90 for SDMs and .80 for goals.  
Trauma Experiences 
To ensure both cultural and PTSD groups had experienced similar levels of lifetime 
exposure to traumatic events, the Trauma History Questionnaire was used (THQ; Green, 
1996). The THQ is designed to assess exposure to a wide range of potentially traumatic 
events: crime-related events, general disaster and trauma, and unwanted physical and sexual 
experiences (Green, 1996). The psychometric properties are good (Mueser et al., 2001) and 
the THQ has been used cross-culturally (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008a). 
Depression Symptoms 
Given high levels of co-morbidity between depression and PTSD, depression was 
measured using Part II of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL-25; Derogatis, Lipman, 
Rickels, & Cori, 1974). The HSCL-25 Part II has 15 items that measure depression 
symptoms. Participants are required to indicate how much each symptom bothered them in 
the past week from 1 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). The HSCL-25 depression subscale has 
adequate psychometric properties (Derogatis et al., 1974) and is regularly used in cross-
cultural research (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008a). Internal consistency was excellent (Iran 
α= .94; Australia α= .95; Britain α= .90). 
Independence/interdependence 
The TST was also used in the current research to ensure the cultural groups did differ 
significantly in terms of independent/interdependent self-orientation. Researchers have 
frequently used the TST to examine and control for cultural differences in the individual’s 
sense of self (e.g., Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008a; Wang, 2001). The 20 responses were coded 
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into comparable categories of the independent–interdependent dichotomy. Self-cognitions 
were coded as independent (private) if the responses referred to personal qualities, attitudes, 
beliefs, or behaviours that were not related to other people (e.g. ‘I am kind’). Self-cognitions 
were coded as interdependent if they were collective self-cognitions (responses concerning to 
particular groups or categories, e.g. ‘I am Iranian’) or cognitions pertaining to 
interdependence, friendship, and relationships or to the sensitivity of others (e.g. ‘I am in 
love’). Each participant received an independent score, which was the ratio of independent 
statements divided by number of self-cognitions provided. Interrater reliability was good (κ 
=.83).  
Procedure 
Ethical approval was gained from Australian National University (Australia), National 
Health Service Research Ethics Committee (UK) and Tarbiat Moallem University and Tehran 
Medical University (Iran). Participants met with the researchers and completed the goal task, 
AMT (only the British and Iranian groups completed the AMT), SDM, PDS, HSCL-25, 
THQ, TST and demographics. To assess study difficulty and to ensure the groups did not 
differ significantly in terms of task understanding and responding, participants were also 
asked to rate “how hard they found the study” on a 10-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 
(extremely). Participants received the equivalent of £10.  
Results  
Participant Characteristics 
Participant characteristics are presented in Table 1. A chi square analysis found that 
the groups did not differ significantly in terms of gender. Two 3 (Culture; Australia, British, 
Iranian) × 2 (PTSD, no PTSD) ANOVAs, with age and task difficulty as the dependent 
variables, were used to assess group differences. The main effects and interaction were non-
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significant for reported-task difficulty. In terms of age, while the PTSD main effect and 
interaction were also not significant, there was a culture main effect, F(2, 115)= 7.57, p= 
.001; the British, t(76)= 3.92, p < .001, and Australian groups, t(81)= 2.45, p= .02, were 
significantly older than the Iranian group. Given age may have had an influence on 
autobiographical remembering; the analyses were also conducted including age as a 
covariate. The results tended to be comparable throughout. 
Three 3 (Culture; Australia, British, Iranian) × 2 (PTSD, no PTSD) ANOVAs, with 
THQ trauma history, depression and PTSD symptoms as the dependent variables, were used. 
In terms of trauma history, the main effects and interaction were non-significant. In terms of 
depression, the culture main effect and interaction were also not significant. However, as 
expected, the PTSD main effect was significant; the PTSD group were significantly more 
depressed than the no PTSD group, F(2, 114)= 128.43, p< .001. For PTSD symptoms, the 
interaction was significant, F(2, 115)= 3.35, p= .04. Follow-up analyses revealed that, as 
expected, the PTSD groups scored significantly higher than the no PTSD groups (British, 
t(36)= 10.42, p<  .001, Australian, t(41)= 9.80, p<  .001; Iranian t(38)= 14.05, p< .0001). The 
no PTSD groups did not differ significantly and the Australian PTSD group did not differ 
significantly from the British or Iranian PTSD groups. However, the British PTSD group had 
significantly fewer PTSD symptoms than the Iranian PTSD group, t(34)= 3.57, p=  .001. A 
chi square analysis found that the groups did not differ significantly in terms of PDS trauma 
type.    
To confirm that there were the expected cultural differences in our sample in 
independent/interdependent self-orientation; groups were compared on the proportion of 
independent self-statements on the TST. This revealed that participants from the 
individualistic cultures had a significantly higher proportion of independent self-statements 
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(M = .76, SD = .19) than participants in the collectivistic group (M = .66, SD = .22), t(119)= 
2.53, p= .01, d= 0.49. 
Research Question 1: AMS 
To investigate the influence of culture and PTSD on AMS a 2 (Culture; British, 
Iranian) × 2 (PTSD, no PTSD) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used with proportion of 
specific memories as the dependent variable. In line with previous cross-culture research, the 
individualistic group (M = .55, SD = .25) provided a significantly higher proportion of 
specific memories than the collectivistic group (M = .49, SD = .18), F(1, 74)= 4.48, p= .04, 
ƞp2 = .06. As hypothesized, the PTSD group (M = .39, SD = .23) provided a significantly 
lower proportion of specific memories than the no PTSD group (M = .61, SD = .21), F(1, 
74)= 20.19, p< .0001, ƞp2= .21. The interaction was not significant (F< 1) thus providing no 
support for the effect of PTSD on reducing AMS differing across cultures.  
Research Question 2: Self-Concept 
To investigate trauma-centeredness, a 3 (Culture: Australia, British, Iranian) × 2 
(PTSD, no PTSD) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with proportion of trauma-
themed goals, self-statements and SDM as the dependent variables, was conducted. Figure 1 
shows the means for ratings of trauma-themed self-concept. The multivariate effect of culture 
was not significant, Ʌ= .91, F(6, 224)= 1.73, p= .12, ƞp2= .04. The multivariate effect of 
PTSD was significant, Ʌ= .58, F(3, 112)= 26.65, p< .001, ƞp2= .42. Follow-up univariate 
analyses revealed that, as hypothesized, the PTSD group had a significantly higher proportion 
of trauma-themed goals, F(1, 114)= 28.78, p< .0001, ƞp2= .20, self-statements, F(1, 114)= 
46.86, p< .0001, ƞp2= .29, and SDM, F(1, 114)= 28.78, p< .001, ƞp2= .20, than the no PTSD 
group. The multivariate effect of the interaction was not significant, Ʌ= .92, F(6, 224)= 1.69, 
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p= .13, ƞp2= .04. Therefore, regardless of cultural group, those with PTSD had significantly 
higher ratings of a trauma-themed self-concept than those without PTSD. 
Research Question 3: Relationship between AMS and Self-Concept 
 A correlation analysis was used to examine the relationship between AMS and 
trauma-themed self-concept (as indexed on the TST). We found a significant, negative 
correlation between the ratings of a trauma-themed self-concept and proportion of specific 
memories retrieved, r(76)= -.27, p= .02.  
Discussion 
Study 1a investigated the influence of PTSD and culture on global aspects of 
autobiographical remembering. First, it was found that the individualistic group provided a 
significantly higher proportion of specific memories than the collectivistic group.  This 
supports previous research (e.g. Jobson, 2009b; Wang, 2009) and the proposition that the 
retrieval of specific autobiographical memories is valued in individualistic cultures as they 
function to differentiate the independent self from others (Wang & Conway, 2004). 
Importantly, however, despite this cultural difference, those in the PTSD group across 
cultures provided a significantly lower proportion of specific memories than the no PTSD 
group. Therefore, OGM seems to be a pan-cultural cognitive marker of PTSD. Second, it was 
found that pan-culturally, the nature of the self-concept can be influenced by trauma. The 
findings suggest that, again regardless of one’s cultural background, transformations to the 
existing self-schema may occur post-trauma in an attempt to reduce the inconsistency 
between the trauma memory and desired goals of the self (Conway, 2005). Universally 
trauma may dominate much of a PTSD sufferer’s life resulting in the trauma experience 
becoming highly associated with the self-concept and autobiographical knowledge (Brewin, 
2011). Third, it was found that the extent to which the self-concept was defined by trauma 
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was significantly associated with difficulties retrieving specific autobiographical memories. 
This supports the notion that self-concept alterations can result in poorer memory for 
experiences about one’s past (Brewin, 2011). In sum, the findings of Study 1a suggest that 
PTSD has the potential to result in pan-cultural deficits in global autobiographical 
remembering.  
Study1b 
Study 1b investigated whether culture and PTSD interact to influence the 
phenomenological properties of the trauma memory itself. As outlined above, cultural 
influences on autobiographical remembering are considered to operate through language, 
encoding, organization and retrieval processes (Conway & Jobson, 2012; Jobson, 2009a). 
However, the PTSD models suggest that the PTSD trauma memory is encoded using lower 
level perceptual processing, is not integrated and contextualized into the autobiographical 
knowledge base, and is less associated with verbal access resulting in certain disruptions in 
phenomenological properties (Brewin et al., 1996; Conway, 2005). Consequently, there 
should be limited opportunities for the expected cultural elaboration and integration of the 
trauma memory (Jobson, 2009a) and rather similar distortions should be evident. We 
hypothesized that PTSD would moderate the usual effect of culture on the nature of the 
trauma memory, resulting in the trauma memory of those with PTSD having specific 
disruptions which would be relatively immune to cultural influences.  
Secondly, it has been asserted that the proposition made by PTSD models that trauma 
memories are fragmented, as a result of a lack of integration and contextualization of the 
PTSD trauma memory, is contradicted by the fact that the trauma memory of those with 
PTSD tends to be highly integrated into the overall life story and self-concept of the person 
(as found in Study 1a). Such authors claim that this contradiction indicates that the trauma 
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memory is in fact too well-integrated into the life story and one’s identity (Rubin, Boals, & 
Berntsen, 2008). In response to this, Brewin (2011) claims that this argument is based on a 
failure to distinguish between conceptual knowledge and episodic memory; specifically, that 
it is possible, and often a feature of clinical samples, that the trauma experience dominates 
much of one’s mental life while at the same time their memories of specific distressing 
scenes are as far as possible excluded from consciousness and thus, remain fragmented and 
disconnected. To examine these claims we investigated what the relationship was between 
trauma-themed self-concept (from Study 1a) and trauma memory fragmentation.  
Therefore, Study 1b addressed the following two research questions. Are there 
cultural differences in the degree of distortion and disruption in the phenomenological 
properties of the PTSD trauma memory? What is the relationship between the extent to which 
the self-concept is trauma-themed and the degree of trauma memory fragmentation? 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 The same participants from Study 1 provided trauma and negative memory narratives. 
Following each of these narratives, the British and Iranian participants (and thus only these 
groups were included in Study 1b) completed the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire 
(AMQ; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). The order of the trauma and negative memory 
tasks was counterbalanced. Narratives and the AMQ were provided following the PDS task 
outlined in Study 1a. 
Phenomenological Properties 
Participants were asked to think about the trauma event they identified on the PDS 
and a negative, non-traumatic event (selected as a comparison memory) that took place in 
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their lives. To ensure participants engaged with these retrieved memories prior to rating the 
memories for their phenomenological properties, participants were asked to write about these 
events “in as much detail as you can. All your writing will be completely confidential. As you 
write do not worry about punctuation or grammar, just write as much as you can and include 
thoughts, feelings, reflections, etc.” (Jobson, 2011).  
To investigate the phenomenological properties of these memories, following each 
narrative, participants completed the AMQ (Rubin et al., 2003). The AMQ has been used in 
research to sample a wide range of properties of autobiographical memories (e.g., Rubin et 
al., 2003; Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Participants respond to 18 
statements about recollection (i.e. re-living and travelling back in time), sensory components 
of the memory (i.e. visual, spatial and auditory imagery), language (i.e. event being 
remembered in words and coherently), remembering (i.e. a rating of remembering rather than 
just knowing it happened), fragmentation (i.e. parts of the memory missing), belief (i.e. belief 
in accuracy of memory), rehearsal (i.e. thinking and talking about the event), emotional 
valence and intensity on 7-point rating scales. These separate subscales were used as indices 
of these different aspects of memory phenomenology. The AMQ has been used in studies 
with other cultural groups (Rubin et al., 2007) and in studies investigating the properties of 
trauma memories (Rubin, Feldman, & Beckham, 2004). In the current study internal 
consistency was good (sensory α= .86; language α= .73, recollection α= .79).  
Results 
Research Question 1: Phenomenological Properties 
To investigate the influence of culture and PTSD on the phenomenological properties 
of the PTSD trauma memory, 2 (Memory: trauma, negative) × 2 (Culture: British, Iranian) × 
2 (PTSD status: PTSD, no PTSD) mixed ANOVAs, with phenomenological properties 
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(subscales on the AMQ) as the dependent variables, were used. Support for our hypothesis 
that the presence of PTSD would moderate the usual effect of culture on the nature of the 
memory of the trauma, but not for other negative personal memories, would be indicated by a 
three-way interaction between culture, memory type and PTSD on a given AMQ subscale.   
The culture × memory type × PTSD interactions were significant for the following 
AMQ variables: recollection, F(1, 71)= 3.85, p= .05, ƞp2= .05 (Figure 2a), rehearsal, F(1, 
70)= 5.85, p= .02, ƞp2= .08 (Figure 2b),  language, F(1, 70)= 4.44, p= .04, ƞp2= .06 (Figure 
2c), and fragmentation, F(1, 70)= 4.60, p= .04, ƞp2= .06 (Figure 2d). Follow-up analyses of 
these interactions found that for both the trauma and negative memories the individualistic no 
PTSD group reported higher recollection (negative memory, t(38)= 6.70, p< .001, d= 2.11; 
trauma memory, t(40)= 4.99, p< .001, d= 1.86), fragmentation properties  (negative memory, 
t(38)= 2.74, p< .01, d= 0.88; trauma memory, t(40)= 4.80, p< .001, d= 1.47), and language 
(negative memory, t(38)= 9.35, p< .001, d= 1.48; trauma memory, t(40)= 6.02, p< .001, d= 
1.82) than the collectivistic no PTSD group. The individualistic no PTSD group had 
significantly less rehearsal than the collectivistic no PTSD group for the negative memory, 
t(38)= 2.59, p= .01, d= 0.83.  
For those with PTSD, for the negative memory, the individualistic group still reported 
significantly higher properties of recollection, t(33)= 5.59, p< .001, d= 2.11, fragmentation, 
t(32)= 2.48, p< .02, d= 0.81, and language, t(32)= 5.72, p< .001, d= 1.61, and significantly 
lower levels of rehearsal, t(33)= 3.21, p< .01, d= 1.19, than the collectivistic group. However, 
for the trauma memory, the individualistic and collectivistic PTSD groups did not differ 
significantly in terms of recollection, t(33)= .39, ns, d= 0.50, fragmentation,  t(33)= .89, ns, 
d= 0.22, language, t(33)= 2.37, ns, d= 0.55, and rehearsal, t(32)= 1.42, ns, d= 0.48. 
Additionally, we found that the PTSD trauma memory had significantly greater recollection, 
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F(1, 150)= 36.37, p< .001,  ƞp2= 0.19 , and fragmentation, F(1, 149)= 29.66, p< .001, ƞp2= 
.17, when compared to the other three memories (i.e. PTSD negative, no PTSD trauma and 
no PTSD negative) (this was also found when we examined it in each cultural group 
separately)3.  
Research Question 2: Self-Concept and Fragmentation 
To investigate Research Question 2, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was 
used. This explored the role of PTSD status and fragmentation as predictors (Step 1) of 
trauma-themed self-concept and fragmentation as a moderator of the relationship between 
PTSD status (i.e. PTSD vs. no PTSD; included as an interaction term: PTSD × 
fragmentation) and trauma-themed self-concept (Step 2) (Holmbeck, 1997). Fragmentation 
scores were mean-centred prior to the construction of the interaction terms in order to 
minimise any problems of multicollinearity and to aid the interpretation of the results 
(Holmbeck, 2002). A significant amount of variance was accounted for by PTSD status and 
fragmentation on Step 1 (R2= .27, p< .001). As expected based on our findings in Study 1a, 
PTSD diagnosis significantly predicted trauma-themed self-concept (B=.51, SE= .11, β= .50, 
t= 4.66, p<.001). However, there was no support for a predictive relationship between 
fragmentation and trauma-themed self-concept (B=.01, SE= .03, β= .06, t= .51, ns). The 
interaction term did emerge as significant predictor of trauma-themed self-concept (ΔR2 = 
.11, B=.18, SE= .05, β= .45, t= 3.54, p=.001). The nature of the interaction was explored in 
greater detail using the method of simple slopes (Holmbeck, 2002) (Figure 3). The simple 
                                                          
3
 Additionally, the memory type × PTSD interactions were significant for remembering, F(1,71)= 10.18, p< .01, 
ƞp2= .13, intensity, F(1,70)= 6.43, p= .01, ƞp2= .08, and sensory properties, F(1,70)= 18.37, p< .001, ƞp2= .21. 
Follow-up analyses found that for the negative memory there was no significant difference between PTSD and 
no PTSD groups in terms of remembering (PTSD M= 3.75, SD= 1.43; no PTSD M= 4.12, SD= .85), intensity 
(PTSD M= 3.48, SD= 1.65; no PTSD M= 3.35, SD= 1.44) or sensory detail (PTSD M= 17.67, SD= 5.84; no 
PTSD M= 18.36, SD= 4.82). However, for the trauma memory those with PTSD reported significantly greater 
remembering (M= 5.21, SD= 1.78), t(75)= 2.16, p= .03, d= 0.64, intensity (M= 4.84, SD= 1.81), t(75)= 2.79, p< 
.01, d= 0.33, and sensory ratings (M= 26.07, SD= 6.48), t(75)= 4.15, p< .001, d = -1.05, than those without 
PTSD (remembering M= 4.17, SD= 1.47; intensity M= 3.48, SD= 1.70; sensory M= 19.62, SD= 6.34). 
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slope was significant for participants with PTSD (B= .12, t= 3.10, p< .01). The direction 
indicates that trauma-themed self-concept tends to be higher at higher levels of fragmentation 
for this sample. The simple slope was non-significant for those without PTSD (B= -.06, t= 
1.80, p = .08). 
Discussion 
Study 1b investigated whether culture and PTSD interact to influence the 
phenomenological properties of the trauma memory (relative to another negative memory). 
As hypothesized, the results suggested that the PTSD trauma memory is somewhat different 
in its phenomenological properties. Specifically, for both trauma and negative memories the 
individualistic no PTSD group reported significantly higher recollection, language, and 
fragmentation properties and significantly less rehearsal than the collectivistic no PTSD 
group. For those with PTSD, the autobiographical remembering of the negative memory also 
showed these same cultural differences. These findings illustrate that those from 
individualistic cultures tend to rate the phenomenological properties associated with their 
autobiographical memories more highly than those from collectivistic cultures. This aligns 
with individualistic cultures stressing their unique autobiographical memories to a greater 
extent than those from collectivistic cultures, thereby affirming the self as an independent 
unit (Ross & Wang, 2010). The only property that the collectivistic group scored higher on 
was rehearsal, which may reflect collective activities (such as talking to others), being 
esteemed in collectivistic cultures (Wang, 2001). 
However, importantly, there was no support for any cultural differences in 
recollection, fragmentation, rehearsal and language for the PTSD trauma memory. The PTSD 
trauma memory also had significantly greater recollection and fragmentation compared to the 
other three memory types (i.e. PTSD negative memory, no PTSD trauma memory and the no 
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PTSD negative memory). Additionally, it was found that while those with and without PTSD, 
regardless of cultural background, did not differ significantly in terms of the properties of 
remembering, intensity, and sensory properties associated with the negative memory, those 
with PTSD had significantly greater remembering, intensity, and sensory ratings associated 
with their trauma memories than those without PTSD. These findings support PTSD models’ 
suggestion that there is something unique about the phenomenological properties of the 
PTSD trauma memory as the properties were culturally similar and contained similar 
distortions.  
In terms of the second aim, trauma memory fragmentation did appear to moderate the 
degree to which the self-concept was trauma-themed. In trauma survivors with PTSD higher 
trauma memory fragmentation was associated with a greater degree of trauma-themed self-
concept. Therefore, our findings support the proposition made by PTSD models that both 
trauma memory fragmentation and trauma centrality to self-concept are possible. 
Specifically, that it is possible for the trauma experience to dominate much of one’s mental 
life while at the same time memories of specific distressing scenes are as far as possible 
excluded from consciousness and thus, remain fragmented and disconnected (Brewin, 2011).  
Study 1c 
Study 1c investigated whether culture and PTSD interact to influence other aspects of 
the same trauma and negative event memories, this time focusing on indices of their content. 
As outlined above, those from individualistic cultures have been found to have lengthier 
memories with greater autonomous orientation and less other-focus than those from 
collectivistic cultures (Ross & Wang, 2010). These cultural influences are suggested to 
operate through language, encoding, organization and retrieval processes (Jobson, 2009a). 
However, as also outlined above, the PTSD models suggest that for the PTSD trauma 
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memory these processes are disrupted (Brewin et al., 1996; Conway, 2005). This should 
result in potentially limited opportunities for the expected cultural elaboration and integration 
of the PTSD trauma memory (Jobson, 2009a). Therefore, we hypothesized that there would 
be the usual cultural differences in the memory content variables of the negative memories 
and in the trauma memories of those without PTSD, however, for the PTSD trauma memory 
the content variables would be similar and there would be less of the expected cultural 
emphasis on autonomy and interdependence.  
Method 
Procedure  
The narratives provided in Study 1b were coded for autonomous orientation and 
other-self focus. All coding was performed on participants’ responses in their original 
language and was based on a scheme that has been used extensively in previous studies (e.g., 
Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008b; Wang, 2001; Wang & Conway, 2004).  
Autonomous orientation  
Participants’ tendency to express self-determination and autonomy in their memories 
was indexed using the autonomous orientation variable. The number of occurrences of the 
following instances was counted and combined to produce an autonomous orientation score 
for each participant; (a) personal needs, desires or preferences; (b) personal dislikes or 
avoidance; (c) personal evaluations, judgments or opinions regarding other people, objects or 
events; (d) retaining control over one’s own actions and resisting group or social pressure; 
and (e) personal achievement or competency.  
Other-self ratio 
The other-self ratio has been used as an index of the degree to which participants 
provide non-egotistic memories and thus, their social orientation. Other-self ratio involved 
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counting the number of times participants mentioned other people and themselves in their 
memories. An ‘other-self ratio’ was calculated for each participant by dividing total other by 
total self mentions.  
Reliability 
Australian, British and Iranian researchers, one from each background, coded the 
data. Discussions were conducted to ensure that the same definitions were being applied to 
the three datasets. Twenty percent of each data set was coded by the independent coder who 
was a trained Farsi-English bilingual researcher for inter-coder reliability estimates. Raters 
were blind to hypotheses and discrepancies were resolved through discussion. Interrater 
reliabilities were good (r= .88).   
Results 
Table 1 shows the memory content variable means. In terms of length of the 
memories, only the memory type × culture interaction was significant, F(2, 113)= 8.90, p< 
.0001, ƞp2= .14. The individualistic group had significantly longer memories (negative, 
t(117)= 4.26, p< .001, d= .95, trauma, t(118)= 5.03, p< .001, d= 1.11) than the collectivistic 
group. Trauma memories were also significantly longer than the negative memories 
(individualistic, t(80)= 6.14, p< .001, d= .66, collectivistic, t(37)= 6.90, p< .001, d= 0.90). To 
partial out the possible influence of baseline differences in memory length, length was 
included as a covariate.  
To investigate the influence of culture and PTSD on the trauma memory content 
properties, 2 (Memory; trauma, negative) × 3 (Culture; Australian, British, Iranian) × 2 
(PTSD status; PTSD, no PTSD) mixed analysis of covariance (ANCOVAs), with memory 
content properties as the dependent variables and length of memories as a covariate, were 
used. As in Study 1b, support for our hypothesis that the presence of PTSD would moderate 
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the usual effect of culture on the memory content of the trauma memory, but not for other 
negative personal memories, would be indicated by a three-way interaction between culture, 
memory type and PTSD.  Contrary to our hypothesis, across our coding domains the culture 
× memory type × PTSD interactions were non-significant.  
Other/self ratio 
Only the culture main effect was significant, F(2, 112)= 13.15, p< .001, ƞp2= .19; the 
individualistic group had significantly less other-focus in their memories than the 
collectivistic group, F(1, 116)= 18.50, p< .001, ƞp2= .14.  
Autonomous orientation 
Only the PTSD × culture interaction was significant, F(2, 112)= 3.46, p= .04, ƞp2= 
.06. The individualistic no PTSD group had significantly greater autonomous orientation in 
their autobiographical remembering than the collectivistic no PTSD group, F(1, 63) = 15.75, 
p < .001, ƞp2 = .20. However, the PTSD groups did not differ significantly, F(1, 49)= 4.18, ns, 
ƞp 2= .08. The PTSD groups contained significantly less emphasis on autonomy and agency in 
their remembering than the no PTSD groups (individualistic, F(1, 78)= 15.69, p < .001, ƞp2= 
.17, collectivistic, F(1, 35)= 8.09, p< .01, ƞp2= .18). 
Discussion 
 Study 1c investigated the memory content variables of the PTSD trauma memory. 
We found no evidence to suggest that the PTSD trauma memory was different in terms of its 
memory content variables. Rather we found similar cultural differences in the negative and 
trauma memory content variables; those from collectivistic cultures had shorter memories 
with greater non-egocentricity than the individualistic group. We did however find that PTSD 
and culture interact to influence autonomous orientation in overall autobiographical 
remembering; while the individualistic no PTSD group had the expected higher levels of 
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autonomous orientation in their autobiographical remembering than the collectivistic no 
PTSD group, the PTSD groups did not significantly differ. Additionally, it was found that 
those with PTSD had less autonomous orientation in their overall autobiographical 
remembering than the no PTSD groups. These findings suggest pan-cultural influences of 
PTSD on expressions of self-determination and autonomy in autobiographical remembering. 
This may reflect those with PTSD having a threatened sense of autonomy following trauma 
(Herman, 1992; O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006).  
General Discussion 
This research investigated the influence of culture and PTSD on autobiographical 
remembering. There were three main findings. First, there were pan-cultural deficits and 
distortions in the global autobiographical remembering of those with PTSD. Study 1a found 
that those with PTSD retrieved significantly fewer specific memories and significantly more 
trauma-themed personal memories than those without PTSD. Second, Study 1b found 
evidence to suggest that the PTSD trauma memory was different in terms of its 
phenomenological properties. Specifically, cultural differences were evident in the 
phenomenological properties of the negative and trauma memories of those without PTSD. 
However, for those with PTSD, while these cultural differences were still evident in their 
negative memories, there were cultural similarities in the phenomenological properties (i.e. 
recollection, language, fragmentation, rehearsal) of the trauma memories. Additionally, the 
PTSD trauma memory had significantly greater recollection and fragmentation when 
compared to the other memory types and those with PTSD, regardless of culture, reported 
greater sensory and remembering properties for the trauma memory than those without 
PTSD. The third main finding was that there was no evidence to suggest that PTSD 
moderated the usual effect of culture on the memory content variables of the trauma memory. 
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Rather those with PTSD pan-culturally had fewer expressions of self-determination and 
autonomy in their autobiographical remembering than those without PTSD (Study 1c).  
A question that arises from these last two findings is why the PTSD trauma memory 
is unique in terms of its basic phenomenological properties but not in terms of it memory 
content variables? In response to this, it is worth considering how memory representations of 
events are connected to their associated memory narratives (Gauer, Alencosto, & Gomes, 
2010). While, most accounts assume that the way narratives are recounted resemble the way 
events are represented in memory, the little research that has explored the relationship 
between the subjective, phenomenological qualities of memories and the narrative aspects of 
reporting autobiographical memories have tended to find few relationships between the two 
(Gauer et al., 2010).  Therefore, in the current study the narratives and the AMQ may be 
capturing different elements of autobiographical remembering. Providing a narrative requires 
participants to provide a qualitative, free response account of what happened; it is the 
reporting of autobiographical memories. Cultural variations in self-construal have been found 
to characterize and shape the reporting of autobiographical memories since its development 
in early childhood (e.g., Han, Leichtman, & Wang, 1998). Thus, by adulthood one holds a 
dominant narrative structure, which aligns with local habits relevant to personal remembering 
and general rules of social interaction (Han et al., 1998). Therefore, it is not all that surprising 
that when those with PTSD are asked to recall these experiences in their native language 
these dominant narrative structures are employed. The phenomenological properties, 
however, are the subjective, phenomenological qualities of the memories experienced by the 
individual when recalling the memories. They reflect how an individual assesses and 
experiences their memories and thus the properties may reflect the distortions and disruptions 
in the properties of PTSD trauma memory being experienced by the PTSD sufferer. 
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Additionally, such properties are perceived to be the products of component processes; with 
each process occurring in a separate behaviourally and neurally defined systems (see Rubin 
2006). Therefore, it is possible that for those with PTSD these neural and behaviourally 
defined systems may be affected resulting in similar distortions.  
Our findings support the following assertions of PTSD theories: for PTSD sufferers 
trauma memories are different from other forms of autobiographical memories, global 
autobiographical remembering is affected and self-concept can become altered and 
dominated by thoughts and memories of the trauma (Brewin, 2011). PTSD models account 
for compromised voluntary access to coherent accounts of the trauma by suggesting that there 
is a breakdown in everyday processes; high levels of stress alter the operation of 
autobiographical memory (Brewin, 2011). Specifically, the trauma memory is disconnected 
from contextual information that normally associates a sensory memory with time, place and 
other autobiographical memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Consequently, the 
higher meaning based retrieval strategy is difficult to utilize resulting in problematic 
intentional recall. Given the lack of contextualisation, integration, and verbal and voluntary 
accessibility of the trauma memory, cultural influences may be reduced and autobiographical 
remembering distortions culturally similar. Thus, models of PTSD may be applicable for 
those from other cultural groups.  
It is theorized that for those with PTSD global autobiographical remembering is also 
affected (Brewin, 2011). Individuals hold conceptual knowledge about the self which 
influences, and is influenced by, the retrieval of episodic memories. Trauma has the potential 
to threaten perceived self-agency (Brewin 2011; Ehlers, Maercker, & Boos, 2000; Herman, 
1992; O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006). Given the self encodes, organises and retrieves 
autobiographical memories, it is not surprising then that overall autobiographical 
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remembering of those with PTSD reflects these deficits by containing fewer expressions of 
self-determination and autonomy. Furthermore, given autobiographical remembering, in turn, 
develops, expresses and maintains the self (Wang & Conway, 2004), continuously recalling 
memories that lack autonomy may result in internal threat to self; maintaining PTSD 
symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Second, for sufferers of PTSD attempts are made to 
reduce the involuntary intrusion of the specific details of the trauma by diverting the 
hierarchical memory search towards higher-level generic representations of personal 
experience before specific experiences are recalled (Williams et al., 2007). Those with PTSD 
from both cultural groups were found to have reduced AMS suggesting that even in 
collectivistic cultures, where AMS is less emphasised, those with PTSD may be making 
similar attempts at avoidance.  
Finally, the self-concept of those with PTSD can become dominated by thoughts and 
memories of trauma (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Our findings pan-culturally support this 
proposition. Thus, in the aftermath of trauma, the trauma memory of those with PTSD may 
not align with the desired goals of the self-concept and be hard to integrate with previously 
held assumptions about the self and world. Consequently, the trauma becomes central to 
people’s mental life as they struggle to resolve these discrepancies and spend a great deal of 
time recalling these events and ruminating about them resulting in the trauma becomes highly 
associated with self-concept (Brewin, 2011).  
Trauma-focused therapies target the trauma memory in attempts to elaborate and 
integrate the trauma memory in order to reduce re-experiencing symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000). Our findings suggest that such interventions may be warranted in those from 
collectivistic cultures. Supporting this, research has found that exposure based therapies are 
effective cross-culturally (e.g., Paunovic & Ost, 2001). However, the question arises, does 
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memory integration of those from collectivistic cultures need to differ to those from 
individualistic cultures given other autobiographical memories culturally differ in content and 
organisation?  
Negative changes in self-concept have been found to predict a greater risk of 
developing PTSD (e.g., Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers, 2001; Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998) 
and poorer response to exposure in those receiving treatment (Ehlers, Clark, Dunmore, 
Jaycox, Meadows, & Foa, 1998). Thus, the findings highlight the importance of considering 
self-concept in PTSD interventions, such as schema work that addresses ‘vulnerable 
identities’ (Brewin, 2003), integrating current views of the self into existing self-knowledge, 
and making sense of the trauma in respect to existing aspects of self-concept (Hembree & 
Foa, 2004). However, it is potentially important that such interventions consider the influence 
of trauma on not only private aspects of self but also public and communal aspects and the 
influence of culture on self-concept. Finally, PTSD interventions may also need to target 
general autobiographical remembering such as enhancing memory specificity (Neshat-Doost 
et al., 2013) and autonomy (Herman, 1992). However, such interventions may again need to 
consider cultural differences in expected specificity and autonomy levels.  
We acknowledge the shortcomings of this research. As this was the first research 
exploring these issues using a cross-country design, we used the PDS as a measure of PTSD. 
While there is good convergent validity with the SCID, future research should use a 
structured clinical interview to derive formal diagnoses. Second, only one collectivistic 
cultural group was used, thus the findings may represent something unique about the groups 
selected. Additionally, our samples were of a modest size but were suitably powered. Future 
research should replicate the studies using different cultural groups and larger sample sizes. 
Future research would also benefit from more closely matched trauma experiences. However, 
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there were no group differences in trauma exposure, traumas in all groups were 
predominately car accidents and the findings were equivalent when only car accident trauma 
survivors were included in the analyses. Third, the cross-sectional design precludes causal 
inferences. In summary, the findings suggest that the autobiographical remembering of those 
with PTSD appears to be culturally similar in terms of disruptions and distortions.  
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Table 1. 
Participant Characteristics and Means for Memory Content Variables for the Negative and Trauma 
Memories (Study 1c)  
 
 
 British Australian Iranian 
 
Characteristics 
No PTSD  
(n= 22) 
PTSD 
(n= 16) 
No PTSD 
(n= 26) 
PTSD 
(n= 17) 
No PTSD 
(n= 20) 
PTSD 
(n= 20) 
Age – years 44.00 
(13.16) 
44.50 
(15.03) 
38.23 
(14.09) 
41.71 
(11.00) 
34.60 
(11.90) 
31.45 
(10.93) 
Gender 7 female 9 female 5 female 5 female 3 female 9 female 
Task difficulty 4.68 (2.57) 4.06 (2.35) 4.39 (2.45) 5.02 (2.99) 4.85 (2.23) 5.85 (2.05) 
Depression 25.29 
(7.07) 
39.18 
(10.06) 
22.76 
(6.50) 
37.11 
(9.14) 
18.93 
(4.97) 
37.95 
(7.74)  
PDS Trauma Type (n)      
Accident 
Assault 
Illness 
15 
5 
2 
11  
2 
3 
15 
7 
4 
11 
4 
2 
18 
2 
0 
17 
3 
0 
Trauma History 
Crime 
Disaster 
Sexual 
 
1.71 (1.65) 
4.52 (1.72) 
.86 (1.01) 
 
1.19 (1.56) 
4.75 (2.41) 
1.06 (1.53) 
 
1.45 (.94) 
5.60 (2.03) 
1.00 (1.08) 
 
2.10 (2.27) 
5.60 (2.68) 
1.15 (1.63) 
 
1.08 (1.35) 
3.27 (2.88) 
.54 (1.10) 
 
1.53 (1.23) 
4.71 (2.20) 
1.59 (1.54) 
PDS Total 6.50    
(5.18) 
26.06 
(6.39) 
5.38   
(7.70) 
30.65 
(9.07) 
7.15   
(4.21) 
34.60 
(7.66) 
Memory Content Variables      
Length       
     Negative 68.14 
(39.03) 
66.00 
(29.37) 
131.34 
(50.96) 
109.29 
(76.00) 
61.37 
(25.24) 
41.79 
(27.11) 
     Trauma 143.73 
(52.74) 
126.25 
(48.31) 
146.69 
(52.59) 
132.59 
(69.78) 
95.05 
(36.68) 
64.74 
(25.03) 
Autonomous Orientation      
     Negative 5.00 (3.25) 3.06 (2.11) 6.24 (3.48) 3.82 (2.16) 1.95 (.52) 1.16 (.60) 
     Trauma 5.05 (2.38) 2.50 (1.90) 5.76 (3.78) 3.82 (2.30) 1.90 (.56) 1.74 (.65) 
Other-Self Ratio       
     Negative .45 (.43) .51 (.51) .70 (.47) .72 (.49) 1.11 (.41) 1.42 (.58) 
     Trauma .98 (.76) .60 (.36) .85 (.59) .67 (.38) 1.20 (.68) 1.54 (.88) 
Note. PTSD = Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; PDS = Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale. Standard 
deviations are represented in parentheses. 
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Figure 1.Trauma-themed ratio means (±1SE) for goals, self-statements and self-defining 
memories (SDM) 
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Figure 2. Autobiographical memory phenomenological properties for recollection (2a), rehearsal (2b), language (2c) and fragmentation (2d) for the 
British PTSD, British no PTSD, Iranian PTSD and Iranian no PTSD Groups. 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
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Figure 3. Simple slopes for trauma-themed self-concept of trauma survivors with and without 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at 1SD below the mean, the mean, and 1SD above the mean of 
self-reported trauma memory fragmentation 
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